Brazil is going through an institutional transition in the provision of public services, which had historically been supplied by State monopolies. A core element in this process is been the creation of a new form of public sector institutions -regulatory agencies with operational and financial autonomy. In this paper we identify their most important decisions and provide detailed analysis of the economic and political context in which they have been taken. We then compare Brazil with some of its peers and argue that its regulatory performance has been rather satisfactory so far, although four main problems must be solved:
INTRODUCTION
Brazil is going through an institutional transition in the provision of public services, which had historically been supplied by State monopolies. Three main factors explain this development: the scarcity of fiscal revenues required to fund important investment needs, technical advances refuting the natural monopoly argument to justify state ownership, and political and ideological changes that have diminished the sensitivity towards private ownership of hitherto strategic industries. The outcome is a set of policies that try to govern ownership transfer and competition with the ultimate aim of improving cost efficiency and service delivery, increasing product variety, enhancing innovation, and reducing prices for users and consumers.
A core element in this process has been the creation of a new form of public sector institutions -regulatory agencies with operational and financial autonomy. Flexibility and agility are required to implement ad hoc policies through regulations, resolutions, and decrees. Their special status also responds to the need to operate efficiently in an environment characterized by technical complexity leading to a rise in the number of interested stakeholders; arbitrage conflicts and potential clash of interests with other government bodies; and the risk of regulatory capture, since the agencies repeatedly interact with a reduced number of private firms.
Despite the short timespan of Brazil's regulatory agencies 1 , they have already produced a considerable volume of regulatory decisions and their media profile is indeed relatively high.
As Spiller (1993) put it, "it is only through detailed analysis of the economic and political implications of the privatization experiences that we may obtain insights about the role different institutions have in determining the performance of the regulatory and ownership reforms" (p. 388). While there are some articles that provide ex ante assessments of the normative framework in which they operate, our paper is among the first ones to analyze in detail their activity 2 .
Given the existence of different forms of government failure, the goal of law-makers should be to design the organizational framework that can minimize the overall transaction costs of contracting. This study therefore has two main objectives:
-evaluate the performance of Brazil's three largest regulatory agencies -electricity (Aneel), natural gas and oil (Anp), and telecommunications (Anatel);
-analyze the main challenges in order to make policy proposals to improve their performance, also in view of drawing lessons for other industries that are still in the process of establishing a regulatory compact.
On the basis of a selective review of the economic literature on regulation, in the next Section we define a few analytical criteria. In particular, following Berg (2000) and Levy and Spiller (1994) , we distinguish between regulatory incentives -i.e. behaviors that should be regulated and mechanisms for developing and enforcing rules -and regulatory governance -i.e. how new regulatory agencies are insulated from ongoing political pressures, while utilizing processes that promote participation, transparency, and predictability. In Section III we sketch the main characteristics of the Brazilian regulatory experience and study the process -whether the decisions have been challenged by the enterprises (or other interested parties), how such disputes have been solved, and who has been involved in this process.
In the conclusions we place Brazil in a comparative perspective and identify the main challenges for policy-makers.
A GENERAL FRAMEWORK TO ASSESS UTILITIES' REGULATION
Utilities differ from other (formerly) state-owned firms because they have natural monopoly components, so that the welfare benefits of transferring ownership to a private investor may not be big if this continues to act as a monopolist: "it is an essential truth that trading a public monopolist for its unregulated private equivalent is not guaranteed to enhance either the enterprise's efficiency or the government's chances of being kept in office by satisfied consumers" (Galal et al. 1994, p. 579) . This is why it is argued that privatization must be accompanied by regulatory reform and that -because of the nature of the services supplied by the utilities (assets' specificity and non tradability) -this process hinges on the (prior or simultaneous) development of safeguarding institutions (Spiller 1993) . These must improve regulatory governance, signaling policy-makers' commitment not to engage in opportunistic behavior and reassuring potential and actua l investors against the risk of administrative expropriation of their assets. This reduces the regulatory risk and premia on financial markets. Specific norms on issues such as market structure, tariffs, and interconnection rules constitute the regulatory incentives.
Those with a significant interest in a decision incur costs when negotiating the amelioration of a market failure, so regulation is best viewed as a contracting problem. Political and social institutions not only affect the ability to restrain administrative action, but also have an independent impact on the type of regulation that can be implemented, and hence on the appropriate balance between commitment and flexibility. In particular, to complement regulatory procedures in a welfare-enhancing way, three mechanisms restraining arbitrary administrative action must be in place (Levy and Spiller 1994) : a) substantive restraints on the discretion of the regulator; b) formal or informal constraints on changing the regulatory system; and c) institutions that enforce the above formal -substantive or proceduralconstraints.
These principles are relatively general. All around the world, issues in the reform of regulatory governance include the designation of regulatory authorities, the definition of their powers, of guarantees against unmotivated removal, and of financial autonomy, the choice of the tariff-setting formula, the fora to arbitrate controversies, and the role of the existing antitrust authority in monitoring access to networks and competition in the liberalized markets. In developing countries, agencies may be more permeable to the temptation of kickbacks, as the state is weak and civil servants' salaries are often low in absolute terms and always lower than in regulated firms. The recipe is therefore rather simple: introduce meritocratic recruitment and pay competitive salaries. A final issue concerns the degree of discretion. While clear mandates which specify limits, either through licenses or through legislation, may reduce the risk of expropriation, rules such as price caps and incentive schemes demand some flexibility in order to adapt to ever-changing technology and demand circumstances.
There is then an important trade-off between constraining discretion and retaining the flexibility to pursue efficiency and other goals. Thus, unless the country's institutions allow for the separation of arbitrariness from useful regulatory discretion, systems that grant too much administrative discretion may underperform in terms of investment and welfare 5 . Smith (1997b) argues that the allocation of responsibilities between agencies and ministries should be decided on the basis of four factors: a) whether political or technical criteria should prime;
(b) whether significant conflicts of interest may raise by sharing responsibilities; (c) whether there are learning-by-doing effects and economies of scope that may favor concentration of responsibilities; and (d) whether political authorities have confidence in the agency (or more in general in agenc ies as a "general-purpose institutional technology").
The discussion so far has hinted at the importance of a "transaction costs political economy" which would give an active and central role to institutional design (Estache and Martimort 2000) . The norma tive and positive agenda, however, should not be limited to the "depoliticization" of the economy by strengthening the rules on bureaucratic conduct and setting up independent agencies (Chang 2002) . In the public domain individuals have motivations other then pure self-seeking and a further facet of the regulatory process is indeed highly idiosyncratic. As Smith (1997a) put it, "persons appointed to these positions must have personal qualities to resist improper pressures and inducements. And they must exercise their authority with skill to win the respect of key stakeholders, enhance the legitimacy of their role and decisions, and build a constituency for their independence".
Equally important, the structure of rights and obligations that underlie markets are political constructs and result from political struggles.
A GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE BRAZILIAN REGULATORY EXPERIENCE 6
The pre-privatisation regulatory regime, by giving federal holdings planning and policy execution responsibilities, clearly blurred the relationship between the regulator and the regulated, allowing a high degree of discretion in the exercise of monopoly power. Moreover, competencies were split among several ministries, local authorities, public companies, and national committees, except for the setting of a number of tariffs, which has been the responsibility of a single government committee, the CIP (Conselho Interministerial de Preços). The practice of hiring the bureaucracy from SOEs also did little to foster the development of independent and autonomous capacities within the regulatory bodies. Tariff decisions were often subordinated to macroeconomic or social policy objectives, such as inflation control or equity considerations. None of these objectives was achieved, but long- The situation is more complex in the case of gas.
Transportadora Brasileira Gasoduto Brasil-Bolívia (TBG), the Petrobrás subsidiary that operates the pipeline, maintains long-term contracts (20 years) with separate clauses to determine dollar prices for gas and to index readjustments on the variation of oil prices on the world market. Gaspetro weights the prices of domestic and imported gas (80 and 20 per cent respectively) and defines a dollar price for gas distributors. Increases in the price of gas are passed through by distributors, who define a overhead before charging the final consumers.
As far as regulatory governance is concerned, three new independent bodies have been created (Tables 1-4) 13 . A positive feature is the fact that the regulatory regime is embodied in laws, thus making it more difficult to change it without a debate in Congress. The lawmaking process itself, however, substantially watered down the government's initial propositions, regarding for instance the regulators' ability to access information, provide firms with efficiency-enhancing incentives, and institute safeguarding mechanisms to protect against expropriation. Moreover, as will be made explicit below, the decision to create two separate agencies for the energy sector has created serious inefficiencies, especially insofar as it has contradicted the goal of increasing the use of gas. Finally, only Aneel has signed a management contract detailing its operational targets 
THE GENERAL CONTEXT: IDEAS, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONS
Discussing the conditions for establishing a "regulatory compact" requires a normative analysiswhat is the content of norms and regulations in imperfectly competitive markets -as well as a institutional explication -under which conditions future public regulation can be made more effective than the direct state intervention of the past. Our perspective in this study is informed by the idea that political institutions interact with regulatory processes and economic conditions in exacerbating or ameliorating the potential for administrative expropriation or manipulation, and hence determining the utilities' economic performance. Core elements of the institutional endowment include informal norms and values, legislative and executive bodies, and the judicial power (Abdala 2000) .
The impact of values on economic policies has been studied extensively in the case of trade policy, especially in the US (Goldstein 1993) , much less so in other policy domains. There is no doubt, however, that the leeway that regulatory agencies have in implementing their mandate is constrained not only by their institutional embeddedness but also by the degree of acceptance that the populace -and the elites in particular -have for their autonomy. The conventional wisdom, often found in the financial press, is that in Brazil the ideology of state-led development -even at the cost of macroeconomic imbalances -remains deeply-rooted and that market reforms find their limit there. The picture is more nuanced and points to the prevalence of contingent priorities over show that in Brazil ownership transfer has not elicited strong passions (Goldstein 1999 ). This is not to say, however, that privatization is being supported full-heartedly. Already in August 1999 the difference between supporters and opponents of privatization was statistically insignificant in telecoms and road transport and negative in electricity 15 .
By turning internal bureaucratic conflicts into formal legal processes, the agencies could facilitate the transition from populist democracy to rule-based state regulation 16 . Legislative and executive bodies can constrain the action of regulatory authorities, usually limiting their independence and/or making it more costly for them to gain credibility via-à-vis investors and other stakeholders. While it is intuitive that a credible government willing to cooperate with a Congress with a common political platform makes the regulators' life less complex, there is not clear-cut formula to determine the optimal political regime. Spiller (1999) identifies three key issues -the centralization of decision-making, the extent of discretionary powers, and the degree of procedural specificityand argues that, depending on the country, various combinations may maximize institutional credibility. Indeed, almost a decade after the virtues of insulated bureaucracies were influentially extolled as a building block for economic transformation (Williamson 1994) , this thesis has been questioned as too mechanical.
In Brazil the executive has exercised almost unchallenged leadership in designing and implementing the program of privatization. As in many other countries, the 1990s have seen a rising resort to temporary decrees to advance the policy goals of the government; interestingly, this has not reflected the need to by-pass Congress, which, quite on the contrary, has rarely been strong enough to amend government proposals (Almeida 1999) 17 . For this reason, in Brazil the challenges to regulatory politics may stem less from excessive politicization and more from the lack of effective mechanisms allowing coherent bargaining over policy design. In other words, insofar as regulatory decisions are concerned, the executive may be under too weak pressures to hear signals from other parties and search for compromise and hence take ill-advised decisions.
There is however a sector in the public administration that has consistently opposed reforms. The
Brazilian judicial system has traditionally functioned rather badly, with a poor track record in upholding private property or contracts and a statistically-significant negative impact on growth (Pinheiro 2000) 18 . As shown in Table 5 , which does not include the particularly heated case of Banespa in 2000, the judiciary has repeatedly and consistently sided with plaintiffs seeking an injunction against the sale of state assets. Not surprisingly, judges are also opposed to relinquishing their powers to independent authorities. More than half of magistrates consider that courts should not refrain from overhauling the decisions of the agencies, not only on procedural but also on substantive grounds (Pinheiro 2001 , Table 22 ). 
AN EARLY APPRAISAL
The previous sections have shown the large steps taken in the second half of the 1990s in reducing the role of the state in the Brazilian economy, the scrupulous adoption of the lessons from the international experience concerning the design of the regulatory agencies, and the institutional and political conditions that have surrounded the whole process. Here, on the basis of Table 6 , which provides a synoptical view of the ten most important decisions taken by the agencies, we analyze the regulators' behavior.
Anatel
Our analysis of this agency is based on decisions concerning ownership changes, fulfillment of interconnection conditions, and redefinition of the regulatory environment in the mobile phone market. It is important to emphasize that in this sector the dynamics of technological progress and the wide differences in corporate strategies make our task relatively difficult, since it is not easy to separate regulatory failures from strategic errors made by managers. In its decision-making, Anatel has been helped by the fact that clear sectoral rules had been set before its creation. Nonetheless, it has also faced obstacles that could undermine its credibility: a) the operators' initial difficulty in meeting quality objectives, given the simultaneous fast expansion of services supply 19 ; b) the adoption of new technical norms to introduce competition in long-distance intra-regional telephony one year after the introduction of the new industry framework; c) the threat of losing control over the Universalization Fund to the Ministry of the Communications 20 ; d) the fact that, in a context of fast technological convergence, Anatel does not exercise regulatory governance over radio and TV services, whose concession is the responsibility of Congress; and e) lack of competition in local fix phone services because the "mirror firms", that were created after Telebras` privatization, have little power in the local market.
The LGT prohibits the same operator to own shares in the controlling consortium in more than one region. Anatel has taken three decisions in this domain and even signed an agreement with the National Securities Commission ( The second important event concerns the terms of interconnection. The international experience of the last decade clearly shows that the market power of the incumbent firm makes it very difficult to introduce competition in the market for infra-structure. In the case of telecoms, in particular, the incumbent has a strong monopoly power over the local loop, so that its position will hardly be challenged unless the regulator proactively seeks to promote access by setting the rate of interconnection on the basis of the marginal cost. This is a key issue in Brazil where the local monopolist in one given region can also provide long-distance data transmission and Internet services in others, so that the terms of interconnection can give rise to a set of strategic games played in different markets.
The LGT allows free negotiation between the parties and foresees an intervention by the agency only at the parties' request. However, information asymmetries between the parties have increased transaction costs and opportunistic behavior in negotiating interconnection agreements. Anatel, moreover, lacks the experience to operate in this environment. When Embratel appealed against a set of decisions by the Arbitration Chamber of Anatel that had favored mobile phone operators in various regions, Anatel denied it a suspension of the rulings. At the same time, Embratel asked the agency to arbitrate in its dispute with local concessionaires over the use of the "last mile" to supply high-speed Internet access. As local fixed-telephony operators enter the Internet Service Providers (ISP) market, more disputes will emerge. Embratel charges a capacity rent -and not a tariff, as it does in basic phone services -for the use of its backbone, that already accounts for almost two thirds of total traffic. Only learning by doing by both regulators and the private sector will change this situation.
Anatel's activity in the area of competition is made easier by the fact that it is the only agency empowered to prepare a case and refer it to Cade (Herrera 2001 where they already operating fixed services (see Table 9 ). The number of players is likely to fall rapidly after 2001 or, at worst, once the large fixed telephonic service operators fulfill their expansion goals.
Aneel
Four main reasons explain the much greater difficulties experienced by the electricity regulator in its action: a. as Aneel was established when the restructuring process had already started, its legitimacy in dispute settlement and arbitration is contested. The capacity to enforce obligations on the private sector was weak from the very beginning as the first two contracts with privatized distributors had been signed by DNAEE;
b. as the process of privatization is still far from complete and some state-owned companies have a strong market power in generation and transmission, the government's direct role as investor (in generation and transmission) and indirect role as regulator gives rise to a conflict of interest.
Furnas, for example, was fined by Aneel in September 2000 for not paying its debt to the MAE, but it has not complied so far.
c. as most of Aneel's top management is formed by former DNAEE officials, the signal given to private investors is that the crux of the regulatory game still concerns technical, legal, and operational issues, and not the creation of the economic incentives necessary to create a really competitive market; and d. there is an insufficient degree of institutional coordination between Aneel and Anp and the water agency, despite the fact that some important issues for the functioning of the electricity sector -such as the use of water rights or the structure of the gas industry -fall under the responsibility of such other bodies. Reflecting all such factors, Aneel has often lacked the flexibility to define key rules to encourage entry, stimulate investment, and increase electricity capacity. To give just an example, the delays accumulated in defining transmission charges or the pass-through mechanism for the purchase price of imported gas have slowed the start of the auctioning of licenses for, respectively, new transmission lines and new generation projects. In what follows we focus on three case studies, namely the revision of Escelsa's tariffs, the decision not to allow pass-through of distributors' noncontrollable cost, and the decision to assume the management of the MAE.
Escelsa was the first electricity distribution company to be privatized by the federal government, well before the creation of Aneel. Its concession contract set the first revision three years only after ownership transfer, reflecting the fact that in 1995 the regulatory environment was still very uncertain 27 . When it started to revise the contract, Aneel was being criticized on account of the continuous blackouts around the country, in particular in Rio de Janeiro and Ceará. Because of these events, public opinion started questioning the logic of privatization and the tariff conditions set by the government when selling off, in particular the fact that the formula for final consumers did not include a productivity factor.
Conscious of the serious risk of a backslash, in the case of Escelsa Aneel established a process of public consultation and deliberation. In real terms, the tariff was reduced by 3.4 per cent on average, while the rate structure for different users was also modified. As concerns the yearly tariff readjustments for 1999-2001, Aneel decided to make them conditional on the fulfillment of additional targets for quality and unversalization 28 . This action allowed users to share the benefits from the improvement in efficiency that privatization had brought about. Although the original contract did not take into account the increase in productivity -so that in theory Aneel's intervention amounted to a hold-up -Escelsa's management welcomed it. A possible explanation is that the contract ended up being the same as those of the other distributors, although in such other cases the initial x in the RPI-x formula was equal to zero.
If in this event private investors did not complain about the intervention by Aneel, the same cannot be said of its denial to the distributors' request to pass through increases in their non-controllable Of course the risk that regulatory agencies may lose credibility as a result of ill-advised choices is heightened in the case of Brazil. Because of its recent high-inflation past, private investors, foreigners in particular, are sensitive to any signal that government may tamper with tariff policy as a tool to fight inflation. To make things worse, before the debate on this issue formally started, Aneel's director general argued that, to avoid a pass-through of the 1999 revisions on inflation, the index used to quantify controllable costs could be altered, as could some clauses in the concession agreements 32 .
We now turn to the third event, the decision taken by Aneel on 20 April 2001 to take over control of the MAE in order to "increase the flexibility of negotiations in the electricity market, preserve competition, support investments to expand supply, and defend the public interest" 33 . Since its establishment, the operation of MAE has been marred by the conflicting interests of the state as regulator and producer and the vague definition of the enforceme nt regime for penalties.
Regarding the first factor, as the federal government owns the main generators, in practice it has failed to signal to other industry participants that it was expecting such companies to respond to the same pressures. As observed above, a clear indication in this sense has been the fact that when Aneel fined Furnas US$ 240 million for its failure to respect an agreement with MAE to supply power generated at the Angra II nuclear plant, the company refused to comply. The second factor relates to flaws in MAE's governance structure, based shared management by agents that intervene on the pool market at different stages. In this regard Brazil seems to share many problems with California. According to Besant-Jones and Tenenbaum (2001: pp. 12-8) :
"the market and system operator must be genuinely independent in ownership and decision-making from market participants (generators, distributors, retail and wholesale suppliers and final customers). The governance system in California resembled a mini-legislature and […] suggests four lessons. First, the board cannot be too large or it will be ineffective as a decision making body. Second, the voting rules must ensure that one or two classes cannot control the board's decisions. Third, the regulator must be able to step in and make a decision if the board is deadlocked. b. guarantees and penalties have been set for trading energy on the MAE, with an upper limit set at 10 per cent of a firm's total turnover; and c. the Asmae, which was previously an independent and self-regulated institution, is now regulated and supervised by Aneel.
Aneel's decision is correct, although probably overdue considering that in two years no transaction had been concluded on the MAE.
Anp
The biggest difficulty encountered by Anp in establishing its credibility as the "referee" in the market for oil and gas is the degree of market power exercised by Petrobrás in all upstream and Anp sent to Congress a project of constitutional revision authorizing the imposition of duties on refined products, which were exempted by the 1988 Constitution. Until the PPE is removed, it is not possible to open the market to imports, since Petrobrás would be obliged to compete with companies that are not subject to the cross-subsidization requirement and could therefore underprice Petrobrás. But this process requires a constitutional amendment, which in turn has to be approved by a two-thirds majority in both congressional houses.
Yet, despite this great limit on its operational autonomy, so far Anp has successfully accomplished its mission of implementing the competitive model in the oil and gas industry. Our evaluation is based on the analysis of three key events, the tender for the exploration and production licenses, the debate on the free access to the Bolivia-Brazil gas pipeline, and the closing down of fuel forecourts.
In July 1998 ANP issued the list of the blocks left in concession to Petrobrás and of those to be tendered. Out of a total of 6,436,000 km 2 in 26 basins, only 7.1 per cent was kept by Petrobrás. One year later, ANP started tendering the license for exploration, development, and production. Three Because the pipeline is clearly a natural monopoly, ensuring free access is one key issue, possibly the most important, to promote competition in the gas market. For this very reason, the Anp decision was right: as explained in its ruling, the agency found that TGB was preventing the sharing of the essential facility it controls 39 . TBG modified the original planning of the pipeline's maximum capacity in such a way that it could only respect the contracts signed with Petrobrás. Concerning the tariff applied on the BG-TBG firm contractual arrangement, Anp upheld the same criterion adopted in solving the conflict over interruptible contractual arrangements with Enron, that is introducing a distance factor into the definition of the values between the source and the delivery location.
Our evaluation is that this measure will prove insufficient to guarantee full competition in the Brazilian gas market 40 . The only action that may avoid conflicts of interest and abuse of market power is the unbundling of Petrobrás, separating the transport facility from both upstream and downstream activities 41 . Contrary to Anatel, Anp does not enjoy the power of preparing anti-trust cases and Cade has not studied the sector so far. A further problem is that Anp's jurisprudence does not cover the distribution and marketing of gas, since for these activities the Constitution established a principle of subsidiarity, giving granting responsibilities to the states.
The biggest challenge is to design a adequate model for the natural gas sector. In Brazil gas exploration is associated with oil and Petrobrás has always treated the former as a complementary product of its main activity. The 1997 Oil Was has not modified this situation and Petrobrás continues as a monopoly in gas exploration and transportation while distribution is in the hands of regional monopolies.
Finally, we examine the possibility that the decision of increasing to 750,000 liters the minimum storage capacity directly owned by wholesale fuel distribution companies may have reduced competition by raising a barrier to entry and exit. Anp has defended its decree on the grounds that the excessive number of market participants -409 in 1997, of which most acting as intermediariesmade it impossible to explo it economies of scale and induced them to increase financial margins by adulterating fuel and dodging taxes. As a result of the decree and of more efficient monitoring, the number of agents has fallen to 202, of which 194 have market shares of 0.1 per cent each 42. In this sense the possibly negative effects on competition have been more than offset by the reduced risk that consumers be jeopardized by opportunistic behaviors and predatory competition.
Comitê de Gestão da Crise de Energia
In 2001 the fortunes of the Brazil's energy sector -and more in general the credibility of the country's utilities reform exercise -have been overshadowed by power shortages that have forced production cuts in industry and slowed economic growth. Although a discussio n of the origins of the crisis goes well beyond the goals of this paper 43 , it has showed the limits of the institutional model adopted to regulate the energy sector, based on separate agencies for electricity and oil and made it much more difficult to attain this goal. Decisions on at least two key issues -how to adjust the price for imported gas (by Anp) and how to define the maximum value of the pass-through (by Aneel) -have been postponed. Added to the inefficiencies caused by Petrobrás's market power, this indefinition has created a bottlenecks in supply that has paralyzed new investment in gas-powered stations.
In May 2001, as the energy crisis worsened, the Comitê de Gestão da Crise de Energia (CGE), chaired by Pedro Parente, President Cardoso's Chief of Staff, was established 46 . As shown by the high number of resolutions approved (15 in the month to 15 June), the CGE has proven rather efficient in taking emergency measures to reduce consumption and increase supply -and has attracted positive comments from the business press 47 . By including a large number of ministries, departments, and government agencies, however, the CGE has effectively taken over most of Aneel's statutory responsibilities, such as setting the spot price on the MAE, marketing excess capacity produced by independent generators, and fixing objectives to curb consumption. The initial intention of extending the CGE's emergency powers by making it impossible to take legal action against its decisions, which was later overturned by President Cardoso, is also rather questionable.
Indeed, it would have been deeply in contrast to the desire, expressed in the citation at the beginning of this paper, of making regulatory efficiency a building block for a virtuous circle of democratic governance.
Although the CGE is also responsible for decisions in the gas industry, Anp has been able to ga in increasing power and credibility, at least indirectly at the expense of Aneel. The agency's director general proposed the emergency plan that, with some changes, was finally preferred to a competing plan sponsored by Aneel. In June, Anp met another success when the CGE altered its initial decree In agreement with the CGE, it decided to put this right up for auction and to limit in any case Petrobrás to 4 million m 3 /day. We think that this decision was right, and it certainly increased the credibility of the agency insofar as it showed its unwillingness to sacrifice the long-term objective of creating a competitive market on the altar of any short-term solution needed to overcome the current crisis.
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
In this paper we have analyzed the performance of Brazil's regulatory agencies from an institutional perspective. Before proceeding to some concluding remarks, it is important to highlight that -to the possible exception of computable general equilibrium modeling -there is no direct method for quantifying the impact of regulatory intervention. By examining financial markets, on the other hand, it is possible to indirectly measure the perception of regulatory risk in two different ways.
First, by examining firm-specific risk, i.e. that portion of the risk in investing that cannot be eliminated by portfolio diversification and that measure the higher return (and therefore cost of capital) required to become a shareholder in a set company (Alexander et al. 1996) . Second, by comparing through event-studies the stock-market returns for the regulated firms with general stock-market returns, to test the hypothesis that the regulatory package shows symptoms of capture by special interest groups (Dnes and Seaton 1999) . Both avenues are open for future research.
While performing a beauty contest is not among the goals of this paper, it is fair to conclude that Brazil has not done worse than its peers. Simple indicators such as price, quantity, and quality of services, as well as financial results and productive efficiency, all show across-the-board improvements 51 . In Table 11 we synthesize the regulatory experiences of Brazil and three other countries: the United Kingdom for being a pioneer in this domain, Argentina because it is a neighbor whose record Brazilian policy-makers have closely studied, and Italy for being another country where utilities have been transformed in the second half of the 1990s. Three implications emerge from the international experience. First, that the success of the agencies in gaining autonomy and respect from the government, the regulated firms, and consumers strengthens the regulatory environment. Second, that this process takes time and that learning by doing effects are sizeable. Third, that, as suggested by Levy and Spiller (1994) , commitment can be developed even in what are prima facie problematic environments and that without such commitment long-term investment will not take place.
Of course this does not mean that all is well in Brazil. There are four main problems: investment and, as we write this paper, the country faces its worst energy crisis in decades, with serious consequences on short-term economic prospects and possibly on the medium-term sustainability of reforms. While setting up the CGE has allowed to quickly issue some urgent measures, this still represents a imperfect form of intervention. Over the long term, enhancing policy coherence and credibility requires to return decision-making powers to the regulatory agencies, consolidate the sources of rule-making, and achieve higher coordination capabilities. In this sense it may be appropriate to trasfer regulatory competencies over electricity and gas to a single agency -following the British example 52 . Indeed, as observed by one of us in another paper, even in the case of railways the consolidation of the existing regulatory bodies into a new independent agency, whose mandate may extend to other transport industries, is an imperative given the powerful positions enjoyed by concessionaires (Estache et al. 2001) .
Second, the need to better define each agency's competencies, while more evident in the energy sector, is also clear when observing the debate raging around the definition of the rules governing digital TV operations. As technologies and corporate strategies converge, Brazil needs a sort of focal point to negotiate with industrial and financial investors and set the rules over both media and telecommunications. Such body may indeed be Anatel, and clear bene fits in terms of transparency and accountability may be derived from removing the right of granting licenses from Congressespecially in Brazil where many members of Parliament hold media concessions. There is however also a risk in completely isolating decision-making procedures. Society at large should have a voice and, while there is no reason to think that a regulatory agency is not the appropriate forum, its functioning should be adapted accordingly.
Third comes the issue of the legal status of the agencies' deliberations, which today can be overhauled by any judge (Araújo and Pires 2000) . A constitutional amendment is required so that the decisions of the regulatory bodies can be made equal to the ruling of a first instance court. It is imperative to discipline the incentives that parties currently have to call the judiciary to step into the fray and delay business decisions. In electricity and gas the very limited dilution of state ownership in the integrated incumbents is delaying the introduction of competition; some asymmetrical competition in telecom, although the privatized incumbent still has more than 90 per cent of the market Achieving the current large degree of competition has required continuous adaptations (e.g., duopoly review in telecoms, British gas demerger); the RPI-X approach has resulted in excessive costs of capital and has tended to benefit investors over consumers Sources: Abdala (2000) and Spiller (1999) for Argentina; this paper for Brazil; Abate and Clô (2000) , Pontarollo and Oglietti (2000) and Ranci (2000) Finally, the Brazilian experience proves the relevance of a political and institutional approach to the study of economy reforms. Data showing that the level of rainfalls was insufficient has been available for a long time, and yet bureaucratic turf wars distracted the agencies. This way, the endemic short-sightedness of politicians -more interested in the vagaries of the political business cycle -has not been compensated by the long-term planning capacity of an insulated bureaucracy.
At the same time, while there can be no doubt that the pressure of social interests may decrease the quality of regulatory decisions, too much insulation from societal pressures may do no good. The question which remains answered -and whose relevance extends well beyond the borders of Brazil (e. g. Kay 2001) -is how to reconcile the desire to extend the scope of private enterprise in the economy with the need to ensure efficient planning of investment.
be used to supply telephone lines and high-speed Internet connections to public schools, libraries, and hospitals (draft version of Decree 3624/2000) 21 The consortium that took over both companies was formed by Telefónica, Iberdrola, BBVA, and RBS. 22 The final ruling is still pending and the shareholders of Brasil Telecom and Telefonica may still be fined for their failure to reach an agreement concerning the ownership of CRT. 23 Anatel decided to return management rights over Telemar to Macal as it emerged that control had not changed hands. Garantia and Macal had simply agreed to coordinate their votes, although the latter may still be fined for withholding this information from Anatel. 24 The National Agency for Health Monitoring (Agência Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária, ANVS), however, is empowered to both investigate and take decisions. 25 Until the concession contracts were signed in June 1998, the receipts for all fixed-to-mobile calls accrued to the local operator; with the introduction of the multi-carrier system the process was inverted and it is now the trunk operator that receives the receipts. 26 Brazil has opted for the European GSM technology to operate in the 1.8 GHz SMP band because this standard makes it easier to introduce more competition in the short run and migrate to the 1.9 GHz band when the International Mobile Telecommunications-2000 (IMT-2000 third generation mobile systems will become operational worldwide. 27 Contrary to later concession contracts, that of Escelsa did not specify any tariff regime, simply setting the average rate and the structure for different services. 28 According to Aneel's director general, "after the first revision, a price cap lower than the inflation index should be used to stimulate the concessionaire to seek higher efficiency" (Estado de São Paulo, 5 May 1999) . 29 Contracts divide tariffs into two different components. One, revised every year, reflects costs that are under the firm's direct control (personnel and administration); the other, whose revision is decided following a request by the concessionaire, includes non-controllable items such as energy purchases , special regimes (Reserva Global de Reversão -RGR, Conta de Consumo de Combustíveis -CCC), and transmission and distribution access charges. 30 The price index chosen for energy -IGP-M -is more sensible to changes in wholesale prices, rather than exc hange rate variations because the Wholesale Price Index (IPA) represents 60% of IGPM. 31 The CCC had been created in 1975 to subsidize the use of fossil fuel for thermal plants. 32 Abdo declared that, in order to meet both goals of showing commitment to investors and keeping inflation under control, Aneel and the Ministry of Finance were studying how to define an appropriate index. According to the press this initiative was resisted by the Minister of Communications. See "Aneel e Ministro divergem sobre contratos com concessionárias", Estado de São Paulo, 2 December 1999. 33 For more details see http://www.aneel.gov.br/scripts/not/Noticias.idc. 34 Comae consists of six professional members, independent from market participants and subject to a quarantine obbligation upon expiration of their mandate. Consumers, producers, and Aneel appoint two members each. ONS and Asmae (Administradora de Serviços do MAE) each have one non-voting director. 35 However, by the end of 2000 only imports of LPG, aviation kerosene, and fuel oil have been authorised, while imports of naphtha diesel oil and gasoline remain controlled by Petrobrás. After a first postponement to January 2001, the final opening of the fuel retail market has now been postponed until January 2002. 36 At June 2001, exploration and production rights for 50 blocks, representing 3.2 per cent of the total area managed by Anp, have been tendered. 37 This decree was revoked on 16 April 2001 and Anp has started public hearings on the subject. 38 The two decisions were taken in December 2000 and January 2001. 39 According to Anp, "TBG has consistently sought to impede third-party access to the transport infrastructure, by either creating entry barriers to new gas suppliers or putting off negaotiations and decisions" (see http://www.anp.gov.br/gasnatural.htm). 40 As shown below, Anp took other initiatives, but they had to be submitted to the Comitê de Gestão da Crise de Energia. 41 Anp argued that limiting vertical cross-ownership is imperative for implementing the free access principle and making it possible to introduce competition. 42 At end-2000, Anp had withdrawn the license to eight fuel distributors, while a further 75 had not complied yet with the new requirements. 43 These have included consumption growth rates much above supply expansion, lower rainfalls in the summer period (January-April), uncertainty regarding progress in the privatization process, and the willingness of private participants to invest in new generation capacity while the regulatory framework was not clarified (Pires et al. 2001) . As the risk of blackouts dramatically increased in Brazil's industrial belt (South-East) and in other regions (Centre-West and NorthEast), government decided to implement a rationing program. 44 Over a minimum of six months, small commercial and industrial users will have to reduce their consumption by 20 per cent. Large consumers are required to reduce consumption by 15-25 per cent (10 per cent in rural areas), depending
